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From WhatsApp to ValleyRAT: a hijacked contact, a signed Citrix binary and admin rights in under a minute

A single ZIP file sent over WhatsApp by a trusted business contact gave attackers administrator rights on a corporate laptop 16 seconds after it arrived. The LMNTRIX Cyber Defense Centre investigated the intrusion, recovered the payload from memory and identified it as ValleyRAT (also known as Winos 4.0). This post walks through the chain, the indicators and how to stop it.

Key takeaways

  • Messaging apps are the new email attachment. The lure came from a real business contact whose WhatsApp account had been hijacked, so it bypassed every email security control.
  • Disk images defeat download warnings. The ZIP held a VHD virtual disk. Files inside a mounted disk image lose Windows’ “downloaded from the internet” mark, so no SmartScreen or Office warning fired.
  • A trusted signature carried the payload. A genuine, validly signed 2017 Citrix Receiver binary was renamed and used to side-load a malicious DLL.
  • Admin rights without a prompt. The malware used the CMSTPLUA COM interface to bypass User Account Control, then tried 987 times to load a vulnerable kernel driver to kill security tools. Windows blocked every attempt.
  • It spreads by stealing WhatsApp sessions. The in-memory payload, ValleyRAT (Winos 4.0), reads WhatsApp Desktop and WhatsApp Web session data, which is how one hijacked account becomes the next lure.

How the attack unfolded

The whole chain, from message to persistence, ran in under a minute and needed only one decision by the user: opening the file.

Step 4 is where the attacker gained full control of the machine, and where the strongest detection signal sits.

Technical analysis

Delivery: a ZIP from a hijacked contact

The victim received Account Adjustment.zip (3.8 MB) in WhatsApp Desktop from a business contact who later confirmed their account had been hacked. The user opened it ten seconds later. Inside was a single virtual disk, 11101507452026_5DFABCA2.vhd. Double-clicking it in File Explorer mounted it as a new drive letter (D:).

The file names are machine-generated: both the disk image and the executable inside it encode the same date and time, “11-10 15:07:45”. That points to an automated kit stamping each build, not a lure crafted for one victim.

Execution: a signed Citrix binary side-loads the payload

The drive contained B1110150745.exe, a genuine Citrix Receiver component (original name MIGRATEN.EXE, version 14.4.4000.10, validly signed in 2017). Beside it sat a malicious CTxmuI.dll. The Citrix program loads a DLL of that name from its own folder, so running the signed executable ran the attacker’s code.

The user ran the file three times in six seconds, the typical pattern of someone waiting for a “document” to open. Each run:

  1. Copied the Citrix binary and the DLL into a new folder under C:\Users\Public with a random name made of punctuation characters, starting ~6_ or ~3_ and ending in a short suffix such as .afM_.
  2. Renamed the binary to look like a common component: parent-ipc-core-x86.exe, minibrowser_shell.exe or tensorflowlite_c.exe.
  3. Relaunched the copy with full administrator rights through the CMSTPLUA (ICMLuaUtil) elevated COM interface, a well-documented UAC bypass that shows no prompt. Each copy was started in a suspended state.

The elevated process then ran the DLL through rundll32.exe using the export NvIGOUtil, a name chosen to resemble an NVIDIA component. To relaunch itself, it also copied cmd.exe and rundll32.exe into the user’s Temp folder under random 32-character names and as dllhost.exe.

Defence evasion: a vulnerable driver, blocked

Within 17 seconds of execution the malware began trying to load RCFlCtrl.sys (“RedCastle Control Driver”), a known vulnerable driver that can be abused to terminate any process, including security software. It retried 987 times, roughly every 6.5 seconds, for 1 hour 45 minutes. Windows code integrity and the vulnerable driver blocklist stopped every attempt, and the endpoint security stack kept running.

Persistence

Twenty-six seconds after first execution, the malware registered a hidden scheduled task, \parent-ipc-core-x86, that relaunches the loader at every logon. It used the Task Scheduler API directly rather than schtasks.exe, so no command line revealed it.

The payload: ValleyRAT in memory

LMNTRIX captured memory from the running loader and analysed it offline:

  • The DLL names itself NvDriverDiagnostics.dll internally and was compiled about three hours before delivery. Its next stage sits in an encrypted section named .成功0 (“success”).
  • A second stage, 登录模块.dll (“login module”), was loaded straight into memory and never written to disk. The module name and its configuration format identify the ValleyRAT / Winos 4.0 framework.
  • The configuration names the command-and-control server fluxorv[.]top on TCP 443, 80 and 9999, with build stamp 2026.11.10.
  • The module can detect installed antivirus and analysis tools, log keystrokes, add Run-key persistence, look up the victim’s public IP and location (api.ipify.org, ip-api.com with Chinese-language output), and read WhatsApp Desktop and WhatsApp Web session data from Chrome and Edge.

That last capability explains how the campaign spreads: each stolen WhatsApp session becomes a trusted sender for the next wave of lures.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TacticTechniqueHow it was used
Initial AccessT1566.003 Phishing: Spearphishing via ServiceZIP sent over WhatsApp from a hijacked contact
ExecutionT1204.002 User Execution: Malicious FileUser ran the executable from the mounted VHD
Defense EvasionT1553.005 Subvert Trust Controls: Mark-of-the-Web BypassVHD container stripped the internet download mark
Defense EvasionT1574 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL side-loadingSigned Citrix binary loaded the malicious CTxmuI.dll
Privilege EscalationT1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass UACCMSTPLUA (ICMLuaUtil) COM interface
Defense EvasionT1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32DLL run through rundll32.exe, export NvIGOUtil
Defense EvasionT1036.003 / T1036.005 MasqueradingRenamed cmd.exe and rundll32.exe in Temp; loader copies named after common components
Defense EvasionT1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools987 attempts to load the vulnerable RCFlCtrl.sys driver (blocked)
PersistenceT1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskHidden task \parent-ipc-core-x86 at logon
Defense EvasionT1620 Reflective Code LoadingSecond-stage login module loaded only in memory
DiscoveryT1614 System Location DiscoveryPublic IP and geolocation lookups
Credential AccessT1539 Steal Web Session CookieWhatsApp Desktop and WhatsApp Web session data
Command and ControlT1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocolsfluxorv[.]top on TCP 443 and 80

Indicators of compromise

Block the delivery, payload and network indicators. The Citrix, cmd.exe and rundll32.exe hashes belong to legitimate signed files: alert on them only when they run from C:\Users\Public, a Temp folder or a mounted disk image.

IndicatorTypeContext
fb24580a6c3ddf5b640fc3a3fca0f3f5a8306c314c16f41331103ed44032c365SHA256Account Adjustment.zip (delivery archive)
97335eb77df1b40aa2b9fee63fb9bd3c41c6209013ac73b046d88de527e49f02SHA25611101507452026_5DFABCA2.vhd (disk image)
b3f115c4b9d7d1fcde230965f3d2e0dca98346f20bda10ac1f854216d3af91aeSHA256登录模块.dll, in-memory second stage
fluxorv[.]topDomainC2, TCP 443, 80 and 9999
2aadd71ae5732f8cec32191b8592226e5e77bb7d60581580be32ffc718573d1fSHA256Signed Citrix MIGRATEN.EXE abused as loader (legitimate file)
7a91bee028b7db8d24a406115c973a3d05e8403d8dda50293a802f5e7610ae97Authenticode SHA256RCFlCtrl.sys vulnerable driver (signer SGA Solutions Co.,Ltd., certificate expired 2020)
CTxmuI.dll with export NvIGOUtilFile / exportMalicious side-loaded DLL
C:\Users\Public\~6_* and C:\Users\Public\~3_*Folder patternLoader staging folders
parent-ipc-core-x86.exe, minibrowser_shell.exe, tensorflowlite_c.exeFile namesRenamed loader copies
\parent-ipc-core-x86Scheduled taskPersistence at logon
RCFlCtrlService nameVulnerable driver service

Detection and hunting

Each stage of this chain leaves a behaviour that is rare in normal business use. Hunt for these in your EDR or SIEM:

BehaviourWhat to look for
Disk image delivered by a messaging appA .vhd, .vhdx, .iso or .img file written by WhatsApp, Telegram or another messaging client, then mounted by File Explorer
Execution from a mounted diskA process started by explorer.exe from a drive letter that appeared seconds earlier
Signed binary in the wrong placeA process whose original file name or signer (for example Citrix) does not match its path, especially under C:\Users\Public
UAC bypass through CMSTPLUAA child process of dllhost.exe /Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7} or {D2E7041B-2927-42FB-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937} running at high integrity
Punctuation-only folder namesNew folders under C:\Users\Public whose names start with ~ and consist mostly of symbols
Rundll32 proxy executionrundll32.exe loading a DLL from a user-writable folder, or a copy of rundll32.exe or cmd.exe running from Temp under another name
Vulnerable driver loadingRepeated creation of a kernel driver service with a random name, or code-integrity block events for RCFlCtrl.sys
Hidden logon taskA scheduled task whose action points to C:\Users\Public or Temp
Location lookups by unusual processesDNS requests for api.ipify.org, api.ip.sb, icanhazip.com, ipinfo.io or ip-api.com from processes that are not browsers or known agents

The UAC bypass alone is a high-fidelity signal: very little legitimate software launches a program from a user-writable folder through the CMSTPLUA broker.

How to defend

  1. Stop users mounting disk images. Block standard users from mounting VHD, VHDX, ISO and IMG files through Group Policy or Intune. This removes the delivery trick used here.
  2. Remove everyday admin rights. The UAC bypass only works for accounts that are local administrators. Give users a standard account and a separate admin account when needed.
  3. Set UAC to “Always notify”. It blocks the silent auto-elevation that CMSTPLUA relies on.
  4. Keep the vulnerable driver blocklist on. Microsoft’s blocklist and memory integrity (HVCI) stopped the driver attack in this case.
  5. Control execution from user-writable folders. Use App Control for Business (WDAC) or AppLocker to block programs running from C:\Users\Public, Temp and messaging-app download folders.
  6. Treat messaging apps as an attack surface. Decide whether WhatsApp Desktop is allowed on corporate devices, and train staff that a file from a known contact is not proof it is safe.
  7. If someone is hit, assume the WhatsApp session is gone. On the phone, open WhatsApp > Linked devices and log out every device, turn on two-step verification, and warn contacts before the account is used against them.

Further reading

This analysis is based on an incident investigated by the LMNTRIX Cyber Defense Centre.